Incomprehensible, Uncompensable, Unconstitutional: The Fatal Flaws of Measure 37 by Cook, Rebekah R.




Flaws of Measure 37
Swayed by promises of bringing fairness back into Oregon’s
land-use planning system,1 60 percent of Oregon voters approved
Measure 37 in November 2004.2  The ballot title stated: “Govern-
ments Must Pay Owners, or Forgo Enforcement, When Certain
Land-use Restrictions Reduce Property Value.”3  Voters reading
beyond the ballot title to the “Estimate of Financial Impact” dis-
covered that a “Yes” vote came with a huge price tag.4  Just to
pay compensation claims, aside from the administrative costs of
this new program, the estimated cost to the State was $18 to $44
million per year, and the cost to local governments was between
$46 and $300 million.5
However, the financial ramifications of Measure 37 are not the
most troubling consequence of its passage.6  The measure turns
Oregon’s revered land-use planning system on its head, as well as
* J.D. candidate, University of Oregon School of Law, Class of 2006.
1 David J. Hunnicutt, Oregonians in Action Urges a Yes Vote on Measure 37, in
VOTERS’ PAMPHLET: VOLUME 1 - STATE MEASURES 110, (2004), available at  http://
www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/pdf/vpvol1.pdf.
2 Election 2004: How Oregon Voted , THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 4, 2004, at D6.
3 Measure 37: Ballot Title, in VOTERS’ PAMPHLET, supra , note 1, at 103.
4 Id .
5 Id.
6 On February 21, 2006, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected several arguments
that Measure 37 is unconstitutional, reversing the Marion Circuit Court’s decision
granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Measure
37 is unconstitutional. MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Serv., No. 05C10444 (Or.
Feb. 21, 2006) available at  http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/S52875.htm.  The
Oregon Supreme Court held Measure 37 was constitutional and did not violate the
“anti-favoritism” clause of the Oregon Constitution, as the plaintiffs argued, by pro-
viding some property owners benefits that others cannot get based simply on how
long the property owner has possessed the land, thus creating a special class. Id . The
court also held that Measure 37 does not impair the plenary power of the Oregon
Legislative Assembly, does not violate the “suspension of laws” clause of the Ore-
[245]
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the constitutional doctrines of justiciability, separation of powers,
and home rule.7  How can this statute, engineered to circumvent
the land-use planning system, fit in with the existing statutory
landscape?  Does its deceptively simple approach work within
the complex web of judicial, administrative, and legislative
processes?  How can an allegation that a taking has occurred au-
tomatically be transformed into a claim for “just compensation”?
Because Measure 37 is a statutory amendment, the Oregon
Legislature may amend it to clarify its ambiguities and incorpo-
rate it into existing land-use statutes.8  The Legislature’s task is
made even more difficult by a lack of traditional legislative his-
tory, as it must look to the nebulous “intent of the voters” for
guidance in clarifying these constitutional issues.  Despite the
Legislature’s best attempts, Measure 37’s constitutional flaws
likely will be fatal to the enacted initiative.  This Comment high-
lights several areas in which Measure 37 is likely to be tested in
the months ahead, concluding that the measure violates the con-
stitutional doctrines of justiciability and separation of powers,
compels local governments to act illegally, and infringes on local
governments’ home rule power.
This Comment begins with a brief history of Senate Bill 100
(1973) (S.B. 100), which established Oregon’s land-use planning
system.  Next, Measure 37’s predecessor, Measure 7 (2001), is
discussed, and Measure 37 is summarized to provide context for
the succeeding discussion of “just compensation” and Oregon’s
land-use planning system.  Part II addresses the doctrine of jus-
ticiability.  Typically, a claimant must exhaust administrative
remedies before a claim may be brought to court.  However,
Measure 37 circumvents this ripeness requirement by granting
gon Constitution, and does not violate the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment proce-
dural and substantive due process rights. Id .
7 Only the Oregon Constitution is applicable in this analysis.
8 Oregon courts generally interpret statutes enacted through the initiative process
in the same manner as legislatively enacted statutes. See Jack L. Landau, Interpret-
ing Statutes Enacted by Initiative: An Assessment of Proposals to Apply Specialized
Interpretive Rules , 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 487, 496-98 (1998). Therefore, through-
out this Comment, I assume that Measure 37 will be treated as a legislatively en-
acted statute. See also State v. Linn, 131 Or. App. 487, 490, 885 P.2d 721, 722 (1994)
(“In construing a statute, there is no essential difference between one passed by
voter initiative and one enacted by the legislature.”); Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Bureau of Labor and Indust., 317 Or. 606, 612 n.4, 859 P.2d 1143, 1147 n.4 (1993)
(stating that the same statutory construction applies “not only to statutes enacted by
the legislature, but also to the interpretation of laws and constitutional amendments
adopted by initiative. . . .”).
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\20-2\OEL202.txt unknown Seq: 3 22-JUN-06 15:57
The Fatal Flaws of Measure 37 247
property owners an automatic cause of action, thus conferring
jurisdiction on the courts.  Part III explains Measure 37’s viola-
tion of the doctrine of separation of powers.  By allowing local
governments to determine the amount of compensation a prop-
erty owner receives, the measure unconstitutionally assigns local-
ities a strictly judicial function.  Part IV focuses on how Measure
37 forces local governments to break state law by granting illegal
waivers of state land-use laws.  Part V addresses whether Mea-
sure 37 infringes on local governments’ home rule authority, as
the measure is a state statute that unlawfully interferes with the
structure of local governments.  Finally, the conclusion proposes
changes to Measure 37 in the context of the constitutional issues
raised in this piece, but argues that any system allowing for
waiver of state laws ultimately is unworkable.
I
BACKGROUND OF “JUST COMPENSATION”
IN OREGON
A. Senate Bill 100
Sagebrush subdivisions, coastal condomania and the ravenous
rampage of suburbia in the Willamette Valley all threaten to
mock Oregon’s status as the environmental model for the na-
tion.  We are dismayed that we have not stopped misuse of the
land, our most valuable finite resource. . . .  The interests of
Oregon for today and in the future must be protected from the
grasping wastrels of land.9
Governor Tom McCall used this vivid imagery in an address to
the Oregon Legislature in 1973 to garner votes for S.B. 100,
which would establish Oregon’s statewide program of land-use
planning.10  Rather than adopting a system in which a state
agency administers the entire land-use planning system, Oregon’s
system gives local governments extensive planning powers.11
While the State establishes broad planning goals, local govern-
ments are responsible for implementing those goals and enforc-
9 BRENT WALTH, FIRE AT EDEN’S GATE: TOM MCCALL & THE OREGON STORY
356 (1994) (quoting Governor Tom McCall).
10 Id.
11 See  Edward J. Sullivan, Remarks to University of Oregon Symposium Marking
the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of S.B. 100, 77 OR. L. REV. 813, 815 (1998).
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ing regulations.12  The State retains the power to review decisions
made by local governments.13
“Just compensation,” the central plank of Measure 37, was
originally included in S.B. 100.  Section 24 of S.B. 100 established
a Joint Legislative Committee on Land-Use to make recommen-
dations on the “implementation of a program for compensation
by the public to owners of lands within this state for the value of
any loss of use of such lands resulting directly from the imposi-
tion of any zoning, subdivision or other ordinance or regulation
regulating or restricting the use of such lands.”14  However, de-
spite section 24’s inclusion in the original bill and the Legisla-
ture’s recognition of the importance of a compensation
mechanism in Oregon’s land-use planning system, legislators
from 1973 to the present have failed to implement a method of
compensating property owners.
The reasons for this failure are illustrated by the non-passage
of S.B. 849, the “Zoning Compensation Bill.”15  Introduced late
in the 1973 legislative session, it would have provided compensa-
tion to property owners prohibited from making “reasonable
use” of their property or subjected to economic loss because of a
government regulation.16  It authorized several alternatives for
state compensation of property owners, including “annual pay-
ments, selling to the state a 20% interest in the affected property,
[and] having the state guarantee an agreed-upon resale figure.”17
S.B. 849 was never seriously considered in 1973, and ultimately
the legislation died in committee.18  Part of the reason was the
lack of funding available for even the most minimal of S.B. 100’s
provisions.19  For example, initially the Ways and Means Com-
mittee allotted only $1.00 to the Land Conservation and Devel-
opment Commission (LCDC) in 1973.20  Charles Little, in an
account of S.B. 100’s passage, pointed out the fundamental
12 Id.
13 Id. at 815-16.
14 S.B. 100, 57th Or. Legis. Ass’y, § 24 (1973).
15 CHARLES E. LITTLE, THE NEW OREGON TRAIL: AN ACCOUNT OF THE DEVEL-
OPMENT AND PASSAGE OF STATE LAND-USE LEGISLATION IN OREGON 24-25 (1974).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 25.
18 Id.  at 24.
19 Id. at 25.
20 Id.  at 21.
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problems of implementing compensation legislation, problems
which mirror the arguments of today’s Measure 37 opponents:
First, does the individual landowner have any  right to com-
pensation, so long as he is not deprived of a reasonable use of
his land, never mind his fantasized financial expectations?
Second, why should the state give without the opportunity to
receive?  If some land values are reduced by planning and zon-
ing, there are others (perhaps even more) that are increased.
Shouldn’t the people of Oregon, if they are to compensate for
loss, also be compensated for gain?  And third, where in the
world would Oregon get the money needed to pay compensa-
tion claims?21
Little’s remarks frame the three arguments against compensa-
tion that exist today:  lack of justification for compensation, the
unbalanced nature of takings, and the lack of funds for compen-
sating property owners.
B. Fate of Measure 7
Prior to the passage of Measure 37, S.B. 100 was challenged by
four previous initiatives. Three unsuccessful initiatives—Measure
10 (1976), Measure 10 (1978), and Measure 6 (1982)—preceded
Measure 7, which Oregon voters passed in 2000.22  Measure 7
was drafted by Oregon Taxpayers United (OTU), an organiza-
tion known for its anti-tax and anti-government initiatives.23  The
media campaign was conducted by Oregonians in Action, a
group dedicated to reforming the existing land-use planning sys-
tem and protecting property rights.24
Measure 7 was the clear predecessor of Measure 37.25  Mea-
sure 7 amended the state constitution to require state and local
governments to reimburse property owners for loss of value
caused by state or local regulations.26
21 Id. at 25.
22 LEAGUE OF OREGON CITIES, Measure 7 Declared Invalid by Supreme Court,
http://www.orcities.org/portals/17/A-Z/M7decision.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
23 Id .
24 Id. See also OREGONIANS IN ACTION, Background Information , http://oia.org/
oia2.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
25 Measure 37:  No:  It’s a stealth effort to eliminate land-use laws, THE REGISTER
GUARD (Eugene), Oct. 1, 2004, available at http://www.takeacloserlookoregon.org/
press/r_g3.htm.
26 See  Measure 7 (2000), available at  http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov7
2000/guide/mea/my/m7.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
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However, nearly two years after its passage, on October 4,
2002, the Oregon Supreme Court invalidated Measure 7.27  The
court held that the measure violated the Oregon Constitution’s
“separate vote” requirement for constitutional amendments re-
ferred to voters because it in effect amended two sections of the
constitution under the umbrella of one amendment.28  First, the
measure amended Article I, Section 18 by expanding takings lia-
bility under the Oregon Constitution.29  Before the passage of
Measure 7, Article I, Section 18 required payment of just com-
pensation only when a property owner demonstrated that he or
she had been deprived of “all  economically viable use of the
property” due to a government regulation.30  Second, the court
also found that Measure 7 amended Article I, Section 8 by limit-
ing the right of free expression.31  Measure 7 allowed govern-
ments to refuse “just compensation” to property owners who sell
pornography, thus singling out one group of people based on the
content of their expression.32
Since these two changes to the Oregon Constitution were not
substantively related, the amendments should have been
presented to voters separately.33  Measure 7 professed to amend
only Article I, Section 18 and not Article I, Section 8; therefore,
it was invalidated by the Oregon Supreme Court.34
C. Explanation of Measure 37
The proponents of Measure 7, Oregonians in Action, sought to
avoid similar constitutional problems by drafting Measure 37 as a
statutory amendment.35  Measure 37 states that property owners
are entitled to receive “just compensation” “[i]f a public entity
enacts or enforces a new land-use regulation or enforces a land-
use regulation enacted prior to the effective date of this amend-
27 League of Oregon Cities v. Kitzhaber, 334 Or. 645, 56 P.3d 892 (2002).
28 Id. at 649, 56 P.3d at 896. The source of the “separate vote” requirement is
Article XVII, Section 1 of the Oregon Constitution.
29 Id. at 667, 56 P.3d at 906.
30 Id. at 667, 56 P.3d at 906 (quoting Boise Cascade Corp. v. Bd. of Forestry, 325
Or. 185, 197-98, 935 P.2d 411, 419 (1997)).
31 Id. at 672, 56 P.3d at 909.
32 Id.
33 Id.  at 667, 56 P.3d at 906.
34 Id.  at 645, 56 P.3d at 892.
35 Measure 37 amends Oregon Revised Statutes Chapter 197 “Comprehensive
Land Use Planning Coordination.” Measure 37 (2004), available at  http://www.sos.
state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/meas/m37_text.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
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ment that restricts the use of private real property . . . and has the
effect of reducing the fair market value of the property.”36  Once
the property owner has proven that he or she is entitled to com-
pensation, the government responsible for the regulation can ei-
ther (1) pay the owner the amount by which his or her property
value was reduced, or (2) “modify, change or not apply” the reg-
ulation affecting the property.37
Although Measure 37 allows local governments to adopt
claims processes, these procedures cannot act as an administra-
tive hurdle for the property owner to clear before filing a claim in
circuit court:
[A local government] may adopt or apply procedures for the
processing of claims under this act, but in no event shall these
procedures act as a prerequisite to the filing of a compensation
claim . . . nor shall the failure of an owner of property to file
an application for a land use permit with the local government
serve as grounds for dismissal, abatement, or delay of a com-
pensation claim . . . .38
If the regulation remains in force for 180 days after the prop-
erty owner makes a written demand for compensation, the mea-
sure provides a cause of action in the circuit court of the county
where the property is located.39
II
JUSTICIABILITY40
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Measure 37 unconstitutionally confers jurisdiction on Oregon
circuit courts by providing a cause of action for compensation to
property owners, regardless of whether a property owner’s claim
is justiciable.41  Generally, Oregon courts require that all admin-
36 Measure 37 §1 (2004), available at  http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov2
2004/guide/meas/m37_text.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
37 Measure 37 Explanatory Statement, in VOTERS’ PAMPHLET, supra , note 2, at
104.
38 Measure 37 §7 (2004), available at  http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov2
2004/guide/meas/m37_text.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
39 Measure 37 §6 (2004), available at  http://www.sos.state.or.us/election/nov22004/
guide/meas/m37_text.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
40 For a thorough discussion on justiciability in the Oregon courts, see Utsey v.
Coos County, 176 Or. App. 524, 32 P.3d 933 (2001).
41 Measure 37 §6 (2004), available at  http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov2
2004/guide/meas/m37_text.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).  The doctrine of jus-
ticiability has its constitutional roots in Article III, Section 1 and Article VII, Section
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istrative remedies be exhausted before a claim can be filed in
court.42  However, section 7 of Measure 37 provides that the
property owner’s failure to utilize a local government’s or state
agency’s claim process shall not “serve as grounds for dismissal,
abatement, or delay of a compensation claim.”43  This section
plainly seeks to circumvent, for all Measure 37 claims, the judi-
cial requirement of ripeness.44
The rationale behind the ripeness doctrine is to “prevent the
courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from en-
tangling themselves in abstract disagreements.”45  For example,
one of the largest Measure 37 claims hails from Hood River
County, where a family owning 450 acres of pear orchards wants
either the right to build 842 houses on quarter-acre lots or “just
compensation” in the form of $57 million.46  The family does not
intend to develop all the land if the regulations on the farmland
are waived; rather, it might sell portions of the land for housing
and then invest the proceeds into farming the remaining acre-
age.47  One land-use consultant predicted that many such claims
would never lead to development because land owners often
have “high hopes but no development experience or know-
how.”48
In fact, this type of speculative claim is exactly the sort that the
ripeness requirement seeks to weed out of land-use adjudication.
By requiring at least some adherence to the administrative pro-
cess to illustrate actual intent to develop, the government can en-
sure that the property owner has a substantial interest in
developing the property.
The ripeness doctrine is essential in regulatory-takings cases,
not only to determine which uses local governments permit, but
1 of the Oregon Constitution. See Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 321 Or. 174, 188-89, 895
P.2d 765, 774 (1995).
42 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. Washington County, 282 Or. 591, 614, 581 P.2d 50, 63 (1978)
(citing Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or. 35, 44, 400 P.2d 255, 260 (1965)).
43 Measure 37 §7 (2004) available at  http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/
guide/meas/m37_text.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
44 See Jeffrey G. Condit, Construing Ballot Measure 37: Clarity and Ambiguity, in
Measure 37 Summit: Analysis of the Measure at 2 (OLI CLE 2005).
45 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).
46 Laura Oppenheimer, Law Has Fields Ripe for Change: Measure 37 Offers Relief
for a Family, Uncertainty for Hood River Pear Country, THE OREGONIAN, Jan. 6,
2005, at A1.
47 Id.
48 Sarah Hunsberger, Measure 37 Claims Mostly for Homes in Rural Areas, THE
OREGONIAN, Jan. 27, 2005, at A1.
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also to determine which regulations affect land values.49  Under
Article I, Section 18 of the Oregon Constitution, a claimant must
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a takings claim
to court.  As discussed in Larson v. Multnomah County , there is
no way for a reviewing court to know if a taking has occurred
until the parameters of the claim have been reviewed by the ap-
propriate administrative body: “The purpose of the requirement
under applicable federal and state constitutions that a ‘taking’
claim be ripe, is to allow the reviewing body to know ‘the nature
and extent of permitted development before adjudicating the
constitutionality of the regulations that purport to limit it.’”50
To establish ripeness, the property owner must first apply in
good faith for at least some of the contested uses in the locality,
for instance by seeking: “(1) approval for some of the listed, con-
ditionally permitted uses in the underlying zoning district; (2) a
variance from the limiting regulations; (3) a comprehensive plan
amendment; [or] (4) an exception to the statewide planning
goals.”51  This local review allows the government body most fa-
miliar with the land, the locality’s comprehensive plan, and the
proposed development to make an initial decision.52  Even if the
decision is appealed, this process provides a detailed record for
use by a reviewing body.53
The ripeness requirement also provides an outline of uses that
can and cannot apply to the land under applicable regulations,
rather than just a vague claim that a “land use regulation”54 has
reduced the claimant’s land value.55  Local governments as well
as the Oregon Department of Administrative Services have es-
tablished claims processes that attempt to identify the specific
49 By requiring governments to provide “just compensation” when government
regulations reduce property values, Measure 37 provides compensation for some
form of regulatory taking, whether or not one has occurred per se under the Oregon
Constitution.  It is therefore appropriate to apply constitutional requirements for
regulatory takings to Measure 37 claims.
50 25 Or. LUBA 18, 23 (1993) (quoting Macdonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo
County, 477 U.S. 340, 349 (1986)).
51 LAND USE § 14.36 (Oregon CLE 1994 & Supp. 2000) (citing Suess Builders Co.
v. City of Beaverton, 77 Or. App. 440, 445, 714 P.2d 229, 233 (1986) rev. denied, 300
Or. 722, 717 P.2d 630 (1986); Larson v. Multnomah County 25 Or. LUBA 18, 23).
52 LAND USE § 1.30 (Oregon CLE 1994 & Supp. 2000).
53 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. Washington County, 282 Or. 591, 622, 581 P.2d 50, 67 (1978).
54 Measure 37 §1 (2004) available at  http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/
guide/meas/m37_text.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
55 Larson , 25 Or. LUBA at 23.
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\20-2\OEL202.txt unknown Seq: 10 22-JUN-06 15:57
254 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 20, 2005]
land-use regulations alleged to have adversely affected land val-
ues in particular cases.56
However, as the measure states, a property owner need not
comply with these processes before filing a Measure 37 claim.57
Thus, in place of an administratively sharpened regulatory-tak-
ings claim, a property owner could submit a vague paragraph al-
leging that a land-use regulation has been “enact[ed] or
enforce[d]” against her, and the local government would be
forced to waive the regulation, or provide compensation, without
any proof that the regulation was actually enforced against the
claimant.58  Maintaining the ripeness requirement would ensure
that Oregon courts do not hear such undeveloped cases.  Rather,
because the local governing body and/or the Land Use Board of
Appeals (LUBA) already would have hammered out the claim’s
details, the circuit court’s jurisdiction would be limited to black
and white matters of law.
Measure 37 claims essentially are regulatory-takings claims
that bypass the legal requirements imposed by Oregon courts in
interpreting Article I, Section 18 of the Oregon Constitution.
Measure 37 proponents could argue, therefore, that Measure 37
claims are exempt from the constitutional ripeness requirements
for regulatory takings (such as exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies).  Because Measure 37 has implemented a stricter statutory
threshold for when “just compensation” is required than the con-
stitutional threshold, it could be argued that the constitutional
requirements for regulatory-takings claims are not triggered.
56 Ryan Frank and Eric Mortenson, Land-Use Claim Rules Vary by Jurisdiction ,
THE OREGONIAN, Dec. 2, 2004, at A1.
57 For example, the Department of Administrative Services has developed Ore-
gon Administrative Rules 125-145-0010 through 125-145-0120 to handle claims made
against the State of Oregon.  The “Required Contents of a Complete Claim”
necessitates
citation to each Land Use Regulation on which the Claim is based and
evidence or information that demonstrates the following: (a) The manner
in which each cited Land Use Regulation restricts the use of the Property,
compared with how the owner was permitted to use the Property under
Land Use Regulations in effect at the time the owner, or family member, if
applicable, acquired the Property; and (b) The amount by which the re-
striction in use imposed by each cited Land Use Regulation has caused a
Reduction in the Fair Market Value of the Property.
OR. ADMIN. R. 125-145-0040(8) (2006).
58 Measure 37 §1 (2004) available at  http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/
guide/meas/m37_text.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
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However, ripeness is required of any claim brought before an
Oregon court, even if Measure 37 claims are exempted from the
more stringent regulatory-takings ripeness requirements.  Re-
quiring ripeness of regulatory-takings claims is not only essential
for judicial efficiency, but maintains order in the land-use system.
If a property owner has not first navigated established adminis-
trative channels to determine if the proposed land use is legal, or
if the government regulation will even affect the property, the
claim is not ripe and, therefore, not justiciable.
B. Legislative Conferral of Jurisdiction
By allowing property owners to circumvent the administrative
process, Measure 37 waives the ripeness requirement and at-
tempts legislatively to confer jurisdiction upon Oregon’s circuit
courts.  The Oregon Court of Appeals recently addressed the is-
sue of legislatively conferred jurisdiction in Utsey v. Coos
County .59  There, the League of Women Voters of Coos County
(League) sought appeal of a LUBA decision permitting the oper-
ation of a “private park” on land zoned for “exclusive farm
use.”60  Coos County had approved the operation of an off-high-
way vehicle trail system and a motocross racetrack on Coos
County farmland.61  The League claimed that the Oregon Legis-
lature had conferred upon it statutory standing through a provi-
sion providing that “any party to a proceeding before [LUBA]
may seek judicial review of a final order issued in those proceed-
ings.”62  Therefore, the statute conferred standing to a person
with no practical interest in the outcome.63
The court found that even though the League satisfied the stat-
utory requirement for standing, that alone did not render the
League’s petition justiciable.64  The court dismissed the appeal
because the League had no concrete interest in the case’s out-
come, as required by the Oregon Constitution, and thus no
standing.65  The court stated that providing advisory opinions is
not a judicial function, so any legislative attempt to empower the
courts to do so violated the doctrine of separation of powers:
59 176 Or. App. 524, 32 P.3d 933 (2001).
60 Id. at 527, 32 P.3d at 935.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 549, 32 P.3d at 947 (quoting ORS 197.850(1)).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 550-51, 32 P.3d at 948.
65 Id .
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“the legislature cannot simply declare that the elements of ripe-
ness, mootness, and adversity have been satisfied.”66
Like the legislatively conferred standing in Utsey,  Measure 37
declares that the element of ripeness is automatically satisfied by
any claim and thus attempts to confer jurisdiction upon Oregon’s
circuit courts.  This conferral is a violation of the doctrine of sep-
aration of powers, as courts may not be statutorily required to
disregard established elements of the justiciability of the claim.67
Since ripeness is constitutionally required for the courts to exer-
cise judicial power, neither the legislature, nor citizens acting
through the initiative process, may statutorily alter this require-
ment.68  Without the ripeness requirement, the courts potentially
could hear claims that have been legitimized, not by their ability
to withstand the rigor of the administrative fact-finding process,
but because property owners simply declare their adequacy.  If
there is no justiciable controversy, Oregon’s circuit courts cannot
constitutionally hear the Measure 37 claim, notwithstanding the
measure’s clear intent.
III
VIOLATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
A. Circumvention of LUBA Review
Measure 37 circumvents the administrative land-use decision-
making process, not only by waiving the ripeness requirement,
but also by declaring that Measure 37 claims are not “land use
decision[s].”69  LUBA is a central component of the administra-
tive review process and has exclusive jurisdiction over “land use
decisions.”70  Thus, by excluding Measure 37 claims from the
spectrum of “land use decisions,” the measure effectively elimi-
nates LUBA’s jurisdiction.
A brief description of LUBA’s history and jurisdiction is nec-
essary to understand LUBA’s essential role in ensuring the sus-
tainability of Oregon’s land-use system and reducing the burden
on Oregon’s court system.  LUBA was created in 1979, several
66 Id. at 560, 32 P.3d at 953.
67 Id. at 548, 32 P.3d at 946-47.
68 See id. at 544, 32 P.3d at 944.
69 Measure 37 §9 (2004) available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/
guide/meas/m37_text.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
70 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.835 (2003).
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years after the land-use planning system was established.71  The
Legislature’s objective was to create a reviewing body to make
timely, final land-use decisions consistent with “sound principles
governing judicial review.”72  Prior to LUBA’s establishment, the
new land-use statutes were subject to inconsistent interpretations
by trial courts.73  LUBA was thus granted exclusive jurisdiction
over appeals of “land use decisions”74 to determine if decisions
respecting individual parcels of land conflicted with statewide
goals, local comprehensive plans, or land-use regulations.75
LUBA was created to promote the policies of: (1) expertise; (2)
accuracy and consistency; (3) time efficiency; and (4) cost effi-
ciency.76  Accordingly, the Oregon courts have defined “land-use
decision” broadly to maximize LUBA’s jurisdiction and maintain
its position as the primary adjudicator of land-use decisions.77
Since the Oregon Legislature grants jurisdiction to LUBA, it
may also limit LUBA’s jurisdiction.78  In fact, there are several
land-use statutes that limit LUBA’s jurisdiction and specifically
grant initial review to Oregon circuit courts.79  For example, in
Estremado v. Jackson County, petitioner property owners chal-
lenged LUBA’s dismissal of their appeal.80  LUBA reasoned that
because the disputed land-use decisions were issued in response
to a writ of mandamus, it did not have jurisdiction to hear the
appeal.81  The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed LUBA’s dis-
71 LAND USE § 16.1 (Oregon CLE 1994 & Supp. 2000).
72 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.805 (2003).
73 LAND USE § 16.1 (Oregon CLE 1994 & Supp. 2000).
74 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.825 (2003).  “Land use decision” is defined in ORS
197.015(10) as
(A) A final decision or determination made by a local government or spe-
cial district that concerns the adoption, amendment or application of: (i)
The goals; (ii) A comprehensive plan provision; (iii) A land use regulation;
or (iv) A new land use regulation; (B) A final decision or determination of
a state agency other than the commission with respect to which the agency
is required to apply the goals; or (C) A decision of a county planning com-
mission made under ORS 433.763. (2003).
75 Edward J. Sullivan, Reviewing the Reviewer: The Impact of the Land Use Board
of Appeals on the Oregon Land Use Program, 1979-1999, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
441, 443 (2000).
76 Id. at 446-47.
77 Id. at 448-49.
78 LAND USE § 16.33 (Oregon CLE 1994 & Supp. 2000) (citing ORS 215.185,
197.825(3), 215.428(7), and 227.178(7) (2003)).
79 Id.
80 146 Or. App. 529, 531, 934 P.2d 515, 516 (1997).
81 Id.
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missal, as LUBA’s jurisdiction over local land-use decisions in
response to writs of mandamus was divested by Oregon Revised
Statute (ORS) 197.015(10)(e)(B), which states that “land use de-
cisions” do not include writs of mandamus.82  LUBA’s discretion
is also limited by the review of appellate courts,83  although such
review is restricted to LUBA’s determinations of law.84
Even though the Oregon Legislature, and therefore a voter-
approved initiative, has the legal authority to limit LUBA’s juris-
diction, there are strong policy reasons favoring LUBA’s review
of Measure 37 claims.  First, Measure 37 claims closely match the
statutory definition of a “land use decision,” which is “[a] final
decision or determination made by a local government or special
district that concerns the adoption, amendment or application of:
(i) The goals; (ii) A comprehensive plan provision; (iii) A land
use regulation; or (iv) A new land use regulation.”85 Moreover,
excluding Measure 37 claims from LUBA’s jurisdiction is incon-
sistent with the reason LUBA originally was established—to cre-
ate consistent initial review of land-use decisions.86  Although
legislators are not bound to conform to the intent of past legisla-
tures, consistency in the application of land-use laws is one of the
fundamental premises of the land-use system and should not be
discarded without serious deliberation.
Second, it is imperative for judicial efficiency that LUBA’s ju-
risdiction over Measure 37 claims be maintained.  LUBA per-
forms a vital role in the adjudicatory process of regulatory-
takings claims.87  Following a local government’s final decision
82 Id. at 532-34, 934 P.2d at 517-18.
83 LAND USE § 16.3 (Oregon CLE 1994 & Supp. 2000).
84 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.850(8)(2003) (“The court shall not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the board as to any issue of fact.”).
85 OR. REV. STAT. 197.015(10)(A)(2003).
86 LAND USE § 16.1 (Oregon CLE 1994 & Supp. 2000).
87 Although I refer to Measure 37 claims as analogous to takings and “just com-
pensation” claims throughout this Comment (because they are essentially the same
thing), these claims are legally  distinct.  In the Oregon Attorney General’s memo
regarding Measure 7 (2000), this distinction is made:
For three reasons, we believe that Measure 7 effectively eliminates the
prior rule that government’s exercise of its regulatory powers does not re-
quire compensation. First, the text of subsection (a) of Measure 7 expressly
requires compensation for regulations that “restrict[ ] the use of private
real property.”  In contrast to the previous language of Article I, Section
18, which was limited to private property that is “taken for public use,”
Measure 7 is not limited to a “taking” of property, but instead explicitly
includes restrictions on use.  To the extent a government regulation “re-
stricts the use of private real property,” there is no longer any basis in the
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on whether a proposed use will be allowed, LUBA reviews any
challenge to that decision to determine if a taking has occurred.88
The circuit court next reviews the decision to determine the
amount of compensation, if any, to be awarded.89
The Oregon Supreme Court outlined this process in Dunn v.
City of Redmond .90  Dunn claimed that a Redmond ordinance
preserving his property for future use as a public park was un-
constitutional, as the ordinance constituted a taking without just
compensation.91  The issue in the case was whether LUBA had
jurisdiction over Dunn’s appeal of the local government’s deci-
sion, since it was a constitutional issue.92  Although the Oregon
Supreme Court found that LUBA lacks jurisdiction over the con-
stitutional issues inherent in a takings analysis, the court rea-
soned that LUBA should have initial jurisdiction over a property
owner’s demand (1) for compensation, or (2) that a land-use de-
cision be invalidated:
But LUBA, rather than a circuit court, has jurisdiction under
ORS 197.835(8) . . . to consider issues other than constitu-
tional grounds raised against a land use decision.  This is im-
portant because constitutional attacks against government
policies should await decision of issues of ordinary law; doubt-
ful statutes, ordinances, regulations, or orders should not
needlessly be interpreted so as to be unconstitutional when
there is another valid and tenable interpretation.93
When the property owner is seeking both an invalidation of a
land-use decision94 and compensation, and  the government de-
fends its decision and denies compensation, the circuit court is
not permitted to make a judgment until LUBA reviews the legal-
ity of the land-use decision.95  The court insisted upon LUBA’s
text of Article I, Section 18, as amended by Measure 7, to exclude that
regulation from its purview solely because the regulation is an exercise of
government’s regulatory powers to prevent harm to the public health,
safety or welfare.
49 OR. ATT’Y GEN. OP. 284 at 66-67 (2001).
88 Dunn v. City of Redmond, 303 Or. 201, 209, 735 P.2d 609, 613-14 (1987).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 203, 735 P.2d at 610.
92 Id. at 204, 735 P.2d at 611.
93 Id . at 206, 735 P.2d at 612.
94 Although, in the event of a Measure 37 claim, the property owner can circum-
vent the land-use decision-making process; thus, technically, no “land use decision”
would ever take place.
95 Dunn , 303 Or. at 209, 735 P.2d at 614.
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initial jurisdiction because LUBA review serves an essential re-
cord-making function and legitimizes the takings claim before
the court hears the claim: “Allegations of a ‘taking’ are too easily
made in land use cases, however tenuous they may be on the
merits, to take cases out of LUBA’s ‘exclusive jurisdiction.’”96
LUBA therefore fulfills an essential “filter” function for the
courts by “reviewing the facts, framing the issues, and providing
reasons for its determination.”97
B. Assignment of “Just Compensation”
Determinations to Localities
Maintaining the current process for the adjudication of regula-
tory-takings claims, which includes LUBA review, is good public
policy, not only because it ensures administrative consistency and
serves judicial efficiency, but also because it fulfills the constitu-
tional requirement of separation of powers.  Conversely, by al-
lowing local governments, rather than courts, to decide how
much to compensate a property owner, Measure 37 violates the
separation of powers doctrine.
Determining the appropriate measure of compensation is a
strictly judicial function: “It does not rest with the public, taking
the property, through Congress or the legislature, its representa-
tive, to say what compensation shall be paid, or even what shall
be the rule of compensation.”98  This principle is well established
in Oregon case law.99  For example, in Wassom v. State Tax Com-
mission, the State Tax Commission (Commission) attempted to
alter the appropriate measure of compensation that Wassom had
received in an eminent domain proceeding.100  The Commission
sought to tax the entire lump sum of Wassom’s compensation,
rather than recognize the judicial definition of “just
compensation”:
The constitution guarantees just compensation as defined by
the courts.  Our court has consistently held that, where a part
of a tract is taken, the measure of damages for the taking is the
96 Id.
97 Sullivan, supra , note 75, at 499.
98 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 317 (1893), cited in
Chapman v. Hood River, 100 Or. 43, 50, 196 P. 467, 469 (1921).
99 See Dunn , 303 Or. at 204, 735 P.2d at 611; Cereghino v. State Highway
Comm’n, 230 Or. 439, 370 P.2d 694 (1962); Tomasek v. Or. Highway Comm’n, 196
Or. 120, 248 P.2d 703 (1952).
100 1 Or. Tax 468, 479 (1964).
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actual, cash market value of the land condemned plus the de-
preciation, if any, in the value of the remaining land not
taken.101
As in Wassom, Measure 37 violates the separation of powers
by allowing local governments, rather than the courts, to deter-
mine the appropriate measure of just compensation.102  Propo-
nents could argue that “just compensation,” as defined by
Measure 37, differs from the judicial definition of just compensa-
tion in the context of regulatory takings, and is therefore not sub-
ject to this constitutional requirement of separation of powers.
However, this distinction is one of semantics.  Although Measure
37 does not explicitly refer to government regulations as effecting
regulatory takings, it essentially creates an instant cause of action
for a taking if there is both a land-use regulation enforced on a
claimant’s property and a reduction in the value of the property.
Measure 37 cannot compel local governments to act unconsti-
tutionally and violate the separation of powers by usurping the
judicial role in determining how much “just compensation” a
property owner should receive.  Further, the existing judicial pro-
cess for regulatory takings, including LUBA review, should apply
to Measure 37 claims in order to maintain administrative consis-




When presented with a claim, Measure 37 allows local govern-
ments to either (1) “modify, remove, or not apply” regulations,
or  (2) grant compensation to the property owner.103  Measure
37’s compensation option provided voters a false sense that local
governments have a choice in how to proceed with Measure 37
claims.  Because Measure 37 did not provide a revenue source,
and because the existing financial resources of the State and of
local governments are so limited, there is little chance that many
101 Id. at 479-80 (citing State Highway Comm’n v. Burk, 200 Or. 211, 248-9, 265
P.2d 783, 800 (1954)).
102 Measure 37 §4 (2004), available at  http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov2
2004/guide/meas/m37_text.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
103 Measure 37 §8 (2004), available at  http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov2
2004/guide/meas/m37_text.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
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property owners actually will be paid compensation.104  For ex-
ample, as of February 1, 2005, eighteen applications had been
submitted to Yamhill County requesting more than $30 million in
“just compensation.”105  The entire County’s annual budget is
$80 million.106  Compensating property owners, therefore, is not
a viable option if the County is to continue providing essential
services, and local governments such as Yamhill will be forced to
resort to illegal waivers of state laws.107  These waivers force lo-
cal governments to make land-use decisions that are inconsistent
with their comprehensive plans, thus violating state statutes.  As
an editorial in The Oregonian  aptly stated: “If state and local
governments can’t pay, Measure 37 authorizes them to break
their own rules.”108
An overview of the statutory relationship between the State
and local governments on land-use matters illustrates how Mea-
sure 37 illegally creates a separate process for Measure 37 claims
that is inconsistent with the existing statutory and constitutional
framework.  Senate Bill 100 created the Land Conservation and
Development Commission (LCDC) and assigned to it the func-
tion of adopting state planning goals.109  These overarching goals
guide localities in establishing comprehensive plans110 and imple-
menting regulations, which are then reviewed by LCDC to en-
sure consistency with the goals.111 Local governments have the
freedom to establish the structure of the land-use decision-mak-
104 1000 FRIENDS OF OREGON, Why We are Opposed to Waivers of Zoning Protec-
tions & No Public Process, available at http://www.friends.org/issues/M37/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 3, 2006).
105 Laura Oppenheimer, Yamhill County Gingerly Treads on New Ground in Con-
sidering Measure 37 Claims, THE OREGONIAN, Feb. 1, 2005, at A1.
106 Id.
107 Id. In another account of the Yamhill County hearings, an exchange between
commissioners illustrates this trade-off: “Which two deputies in the sheriff’s depart-
ment do you want to let go to pay that $100,000?” Laura Oppenheimer, Measure 37
Exposes Nerves, THE OREGONIAN, Feb. 2, 2005, at C1 (quoting Leslie Lewis).
108 Editorial, Governor Must Respond Quickly, THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 7, 2004, at
F4.
109 LAND USE § 1.5 (Oregon CLE 1994 & Supp. 2000). .
110 A comprehensive plan is a “generalized, coordinated land-use map and policy
statement of the governing body of a local government that interrelates all func-
tional and natural systems and activities relating to the use of lands . . . .” OR. REV.
STAT. § 197.015(5)(2003).
111 LAND USE § 1.7 (Oregon CLE 1994 & Supp. 2000) (citing ORS § 197.225-
197.250).
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ing process.112  When any new administrative rule or land-use
legislation is adopted, the Department of Land Conservation and
Development must notify local governments.113  The localities
must then amend their plans and regulations to comply with
these new rules or legislation.114  Therefore, although the land-
use program is run on a statewide level, it is the local govern-
ments that are responsible for almost all planning decisions.115
Measure 37 requires the government that “enforces” an en-
acted land-use regulation to compensate the property owner.116
Since local governments are the primary enforcers of state regu-
lations, it is likely that local governments will be liable for most
of the compensation claims under Measure 37, even though they
are only enforcing state law.117
The Oregon Legislature delegates the authority to implement
comprehensive plans to the LCDC, an administrative agency.118
The constitutionality of this delegation of statutory authority was
challenged in Meyer v. Lord.119  The court found that the delega-
tion of legislative power to the LCDC did not violate the Oregon
Constitution, as it fulfilled the test for the validity of the delega-
tion: “Whether the practical necessities of the efficient adminis-
tration of legislative policy requiring the delegation of discretion
outweigh the danger or discriminate [sic] action.”120
A lawful delegation of power is subject to “standards and crite-
ria” to limit the exercise of legislative power by the agency, and
in turn, the local governments.121  Oregon statutes, the planning
goals and guidelines, administrative rules, comprehensive plans,
and local ordinances represent the “standards and criteria” that
make regulation by local governments legal under this bi-level
system.122  It is, therefore, essential to the lawful delegation of
112 Steven R. Schell, Overview of Oregon Land Use System: Its History and How it
Works, in MAJOR LAND USE LAWS IN OREGON 19 (National Business Institute ed.,
1994).
113 LAND USE § 1.7 (Oregon CLE 1994 & Supp. 2000).
114 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.250 (2003).
115 LAND USE § 1.30 (Oregon CLE 1994 & Supp. 2000).
116 Measure 37 §1 (2004) available at  http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov2
2004/guide/meas/m37_text.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
117 LAND USE § 1.30 (Oregon CLE 1994 & Supp. 2000).
118 Id . at § 10.66.
119 37 Or. App. 59, 586 P.2d 367 (1978).
120 Id. at 65, 586 P.2d at 371 (citing Horner’s Mkt., Inc. v. Tri-County Metro.
Trans. Dist., 256 Or. 124, 132-33, 471 P.2d 798, 802 (1970)).
121 LAND USE § 10.66 (Oregon CLE 1994 & Supp. 2000).
122 Id. at § 10.70.
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power, and the implementation of the land-use system as a
whole, that this current balance of powers be maintained.
Measure 37 disrupts the balance of delegated powers between
the State and local governments.  By allowing local governments
to “modify, amend or not apply” land-use regulations—com-
monly referred to as the power to issue “waivers”—local govern-
ments are forced to illegally waive state laws.  Under Measure 37,
waivers are made by local governments without consideration of
the aforementioned standards and criteria.  Without such consid-
eration, the foundation of the bi-level system is destroyed, and
Measure 37 waivers essentially return the state to “spot zoning,”
a practice that the land-use system was established to prevent in
the first place.  Measure 37 will create “[s]pot zoning in its least
savory sense”123 by creating potential “commercial island[s]”124
in residential areas and golf courses among feed lots.
In the current land-use planning system, the mechanisms most
comparable to Measure 37 waivers are “variances.”  Variances
are permits “authorizing use of a particular piece of property in a
way that is otherwise prohibited by the local land-use ordi-
nance.”125  The traditional purpose of a variance is to grant relief
to property owners when land-use regulations make the land
“completely unusable or usable only with extraordinary ef-
fort.”126  However, the similarities between Measure 37 waivers
and variances end there, as Measure 37 waivers lack the procedu-
ral safeguards required of variances—safeguards which help
maintain the balance of delegated power between the State and
local governments.  Indeed, variances must be used sparingly be-
cause “a liberal policy of granting improper variances can under-
mine the goals of the comprehensive plan.”127
A comparison of Measure 37 waivers to variances illustrates
the safeguards that must be added to the Measure 37 decision-
making process to prevent violations of state law by local govern-
ments.  One safeguard imposed on the variance process was out-
lined by the Oregon Supreme Court in Fasano v. Washington Co.
Comm’rs,  a decision which requires local governments to hold
123 Shaffner v. City of Salem, 201 Or. 45, 53, 268 P.2d 599, 603 (1954).
124 Id. at 55, 268 P.2d at 604.
125 LAND USE § 11.2 (Oregon CLE 1994 & Supp. 2000) (quoting ROBERT M. AN-
DERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 20.02, at 365-67 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1992)).
126 Id.
127 Id.
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quasi-judicial proceedings if a variance is sought.128  In these va-
riance proceedings, the local government must consider estab-
lished criteria in making its land-use decisions.129  Typically a
property owner must show that, without a variance, it cannot
make reasonable use of the property or that some unreasonable
hardship justifies the variance.130 Fasano also requires that the
parties involved have an opportunity to be heard and to present
evidence in certain land-use proceedings.131  Measure 37 would
be greatly improved, and Oregon’s land use planning system
could be preserved, if these procedural safeguards were added to
the measure to prevent violations of state laws.
An Oregon Attorney General memorandum illustrates the co-
nundrum in which Measure 37 places local governments.132  The
memorandum points out that subsection 8 of the initiative “only
gives authority to waive a law to the governing body responsible
for enacting the law that gives rise to a claim.”133 It also asserts
that only the state legislature has the power to waive state law,
and a “local governments would not have the authority to waive
state statutes or rules that they are required to apply to their de-
cisions.”134  If local governments cannot waive the state laws that
guide their decision-making, then they must compensate the
property owners.135  Yet, local governments do not have the re-
sources to pay compensation.  Local governments are thus stuck
in the middle of the statutory inconsistency created by Measure
37, and have no choice but to grant illegal waivers of state laws.
128 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
129 See  Sokol v. City of Lake Oswego, 17 Or. LUBA 429, 434 (1989).
130 LAND USE § 11.20-21 (Oregon CLE 1994 & Supp. 2000).
131 Fasano , 264 Or. at 588, 507 P.2d at 30 (“Parties at the hearing before the
county governing body are entitled to an opportunity to be heard, to an opportunity
to present and rebut evidence, to a tribunal which is impartial in the matter—i.e.,
having had no pre-hearing or ex parte contacts concerning the question at issue—
and to a record made and adequate findings executed.”)
132 See  Memorandum from Richard Whitman, AIC Natural Resources Section,
Or. Dep’t of Justice to Lane Shetterly, Director, Land Conservation and Dev.
Comm’n, and Jim Brown, State Forester, Or. Dep’t of Forestry (July 19, 2004), avail-
able at http://www.orcities.org/portals/17/currentissues/M37/M37DraftAGOpinion.
pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
133 Id. at 3.
134 Id .
135 Id.
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V
VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF HOME RULE
Measure 37’s passage raises serious questions regarding the vi-
olation of local governments’ home rule authority.136 The mea-
sure fundamentally alters the structures and procedures of local
governments, infringing upon an area immune from state control.
How can voters decide as a state to implement policies compel-
ling local governments to either alter their existing comprehen-
sive plans or pay compensation claims that will significantly
detract from other budgetary obligations?
The home rule power refers to a distinct sphere of local au-
thority identified by the Oregon Constitution.137  There are two
objectives fulfilled by home rule.138  The first is to delegate gen-
eral state authority to localities, rather than forcing cities to seek
explicit delegations of power from the State each time they seek
to act.139  The second objective is to give cities a sphere of au-
thority protected from state interference.140
The home rule power of Oregon’s local governments is derived
from Article XI, Section 2 and Article IV, Section 1(5) of the
Oregon Constitution.  These provisions allow city and county
voters to adopt and amend charters, which in turn authorize local
governments to legislate on any matter within their jurisdictional
boundaries.141
The home rule power is limited by federal and state laws, as
well as administrative rules.142  In Oregon, the home rule power
has also been substantially limited by the landmark decision in
City of La Grande v. Public Employees Retirement Board.143
There, the court found that if a state law and a local law conflict
in an “area of substantive policy, the state law will displace the
136 OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1859, amended 2000) (“The initiative and referendum
powers reserved to the people . . .  are further reserved to the qualified voters of
each municipality and district as to all local, special and municipal legislation of
every character in or for their municipality or district.”)
137 GERALD E. FRUG, RICHARD T. FORD & DAVID J. BARRON, LOCAL GOVERN-




141 LAND USE § 13.5 (Oregon CLE 1994 & Supp. 2000).
142 Id.
143 281 Or. 137, 576 P.2d 1204 (1978).
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local rule.”144  Prior to this decision, matters primarily of local
concern were immune from state interference.145  However the
court did preserve local governments’ power over the structure  of
their government:
When a statute is addressed to a concern of the state with
the structure and procedures of local agencies, the statute im-
pinges on the powers reserved by the amendments to the citi-
zens of local communities.  Such a state concern must be
justified by a need to safeguard the interests of persons or en-
tities affected by the procedures of local government.
Conversely, a general law addressed primarily to substan-
tive social, economic, or other regulatory objectives of the
state prevails over contrary policies preferred by some local
governments if it is clearly intended to do so, unless the law is
shown to be irreconcilable with the community’s freedom to
choose its own political form.  In that case, such a state law
must yield in those particulars necessary to preserve that free-
dom of local organization.146
Home rule plays a complex role in land-use planning.  Since
the State has delegated to local governments the power to imple-
ment comprehensive plans, and the State has the power to pass
subsequent legislation modifying those plans, local land-use plan-
ning power is already substantially controlled and limited by the
State.  However, by forcing local governments to establish new
administrative processes for Measure 37 claims, the measure’s ef-
fects reach beyond the administration of comprehensive plans to
infringe on the very structure of local agencies.147
In addition, given the enormous financial burden compensa-
tion claims place on local governments, the measure has the po-
tential to induce large scale structural alterations in local
governments; if a local government is suddenly forced to spend
half of its annual budget on Measure 37 claims, essential services
will have to be eliminated.  For example, in Marion County two
brothers have submitted a claim demanding the County pay them
$150 million in “just compensation” if they are not allowed to
build their envisioned casino and golf course in St. Paul, Ore-
144 Id. at 149, 576 P.2d at 1211 (citations omitted).
145 See State ex rel Heinig v. Milwaukie, 231 Or. 473, 373 P.2d 680 (1962).
146 City of La Grande  281 Or. at 156, 576 P.2d at 1215.
147 “Force” is used in a practical, not a legal, sense.  Though Measure 37 states
local governments “may” establish claims procedures, it would be nearly impossible
for local governments to handle the influx of claims without establishing these
procedures.
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gon.148  The County faces a dire choice.  Either it must waive its
regulations prohibiting such development in Oregon’s most pro-
ductive farmland, or it must find a way to pay the brothers’ $150
million dollar claim from its $304.5 million annual budget.149
Local governments should not be forced to make such changes
to their political structures, and should not have to choose be-
tween compensating a property owner and providing essential
services.  Because these areas are immune from state legislation,
Measure 37 violates the home rule authority of local
governments.
However, there is an equally strong argument that the pay-
ment of “just compensation” is a matter of statewide concern
that should be legislated on the state level, even at the expense of
local governments.  The issue of home rule and land-use planning
was addressed in Seida v. Lincoln City.150  In that case Lincoln
City argued that the courts could not force cities and counties to
make land-use decisions because this would infringe on their lo-
cal government functions.151  The court held that, because land-
use statutes are legislative enactments imposing standards on lo-
calities pursuant to substantive regulatory objectives of the State,
the statutes are a proper exercise of “state legislative authority
and [do] not intrude upon the constitutional home rule authority
of cities.”152
Similarly, proponents of Measure 37 could argue that all Ore-
gon property owners should be protected against unfair land-use
regulations and receive “just compensation” for any reduction in
their property values.  Under such an argument, Measure 37 is
furthering a substantive state objective, and is therefore a legiti-
mate subject for state legislation.
Finally, Measure 37 does not literally require local govern-
ments to establish claims processes, although most have opted to
establish them.153  By using the term “may adopt,” the measure’s
148 A constitutional amendment would be required to allow the building of a ca-
sino on nontribal lands in Oregon. See Ron Soble, Casino Idea Strains St. Paul’s
Rural Ties , THE OREGONIAN, Feb. 13, 2005, at A17.
149 MARION COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Marion County Fiscal Year
2004-2005 Adopted Budget available at  http://commissioners.co.marion.or.us/budget
%2004-05/summary.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
150 160 Or. App. 499, 505-06, 982 P.2d 31, 34 (1999) (citations omitted).
151 Id .
152 Id .
153 Measure 37 §7 (2004) available at  http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov2
2004/guide/meas/m37_text.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
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drafters have provided a possible loophole to thwart arguments
that the measure violates local governments’ home rule author-
ity.154  The answer to this constitutional question will largely
hinge on how a court faced with the issue defines the sphere of
local home rule authority.  If an Oregon court were to determine
that Measure 37 alters the structures and procedures of local gov-
ernments, under La Grande, it should also hold that the measure
infringes upon areas immune from state control.
CONCLUSION
Measure 37 offers property owners protection from land-use
regulation beyond what is required in the Oregon Constitution,
and even beyond the protection offered anywhere else in the
United States.  But waiver of land-use regulations cannot be im-
plemented without also implementing the constitutional safe-
guards that sustain Oregon’s statutory land-use scheme.  If the
2007 Oregon Legislature does not make Measure 37 claims sub-
ject to these constitutional safeguards, or if a substitute initiative
is not passed in the next year, Measure 37 claims will burden
Oregon courts for years to come.  It seems that even the mea-
sure’s framers anticipated that the courts would be the arbiters of
Measure 37 conflicts; the executive director of Oregonians in Ac-
tion, Dave Hunnicutt, warned local governments “not to charge
high fees (applicants will skirt the process), pit neighbors against
one another (Oregonians in Action may sue), or outlaw property
owners from passing on their new rights when they sell the land
(ditto on the lawsuits).”155
Measure 37 violates the constitutional doctrines of justiciability
and separation of powers, compels local governments to act ille-
gally, and infringes on local governments’ home rule power.  In
the 2005 session of the Oregon Legislature, several bills were in-
troduced to help clarify and implement Measure 37.156  The most
promising legislation was Senate Bill 1037, the product of months
of deliberation in the Senate land-use committee.157  Coming out
of the Senate, S.B. 1037 established an application and judicial-
154 Id .
155 Laura Oppenheimer, Land Appeals May Face New Rules, THE OREGONIAN,
Nov. 28, 2004, at A1 (quoting Dave Hunnicutt).
156 See S.B. 308, 73d Or. Legis. Ass’y (2005); see  S.B. 406, 73d Or. Legis. Ass’y
(2005); see  S.B. 1037, 73d Or. Legis. Ass’y (2005).
157 See Laura Oppenheimer, Mild Measure 37 Bill Passes, THE OREGONIAN, July
8, 2005, at C1.
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review process for Measure 37 claims.158  However, the House
land-use committee did not think the Senate’s version adequately
protected landowners and scrapped this compromise version.159
The House’s revised version of S.B. 1037 embodied most of the
demands of property rights activists, most notably, a provision
allowing property owners to transfer their Measure 37 exemp-
tions to future landowners.160  A compromise between the House
and Senate versions of S.B. 1037 could not be reached before the
Legislature adjourned, leaving local governments and Oregon
courts to iron out the initiative’s details.  By adjourning without a
resolution, the Legislature missed Oregon’s best opportunity to
remedy the measure’s constitutional flaws, flaws that will likely
prove fatal to the enacted initiative.
First, section 7 of Measure 37 must be altered to require prop-
erty owners to submit their claims either through the State or
through local government processes.  In addition, a final decision
by the appropriate government must be a mandatory require-
ment before a Measure 37 claim can proceed to a circuit court.
The inclusion of section 7, allowing property owners to circum-
vent governments’ claims processes, reflects some property own-
ers’ perceptions that governments abuse the ripeness
requirement to obstruct even the most legitimate claims.  Al-
though this may be one effect of the ripeness requirement, it is
nevertheless a constitutionally required element of a justiciable
claim, and may not be circumvented by statute.
If the necessary change is not made, not only could the mea-
sure be found unconstitutional, but Oregon courts will be bur-
dened by speculative claims lacking in merit.  An overburdened
claims process frustrates Measure 37’s intent to provide a solu-
tion for those property owners who truly face severe hardship
due to land-use regulations.  Additionally, more property owners
with legitimate claims will be assisted if section 9, which states
that decisions on Measure 37 claims are not “land use decisions,”
is removed.  Since this section effectively removes Measure 37
claims from LUBA’s jurisdiction, the court system will be further
paralyzed by a litany of meritless Measure 37 claims that could
have been filtered out by LUBA review.
158 See Laura Oppenheimer, Political Notebook: Bill to Revise Measure 37 Passes
House Committee, THE OREGONIAN, July 21, 2005, at D7.
159 See id.
160 See id .
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\20-2\OEL202.txt unknown Seq: 27 22-JUN-06 15:57
The Fatal Flaws of Measure 37 271
Second, section 4 of Measure 37 should be amended to clarify
that it is not within the power of the State or of local govern-
ments to determine the amount of “just compensation” a prop-
erty owner receives.  Unless a court finds that the method for
determining compensation under Measure 37 should be distinct
from that used for constitutional regulatory takings, allowing any
branch of government other than the judiciary to determine the
amount of compensation violates the separation of powers.
Third, Measure 37 must provide a revenue source to pay com-
pensation claims on a statewide level.  Local governments do not
have the ability to pay these claims—nor should they, since they
are implementing state law.  Also, by providing a statewide fund-
ing source, the impact on local governments’ structures and pro-
cedures would be much reduced, and the violation of local
governments’ home rule authority thereby substantially
diminished.
There are several different forms a statewide compensation
scheme could take (aside from drawing compensation payments
straight from the coffers of the State’s general fund).  For in-
stance, “transferable development credits” have been suggested:
Property owners who are not allowed to build on farmland
could be given these credits.  They could then sell their credits
at a fair market rate to a developer of land newly brought into
an urban growth boundary, who could only build by buying
enough credits from rural property owners.161
Fourth, to ensure that communities are involved in the process,
the measure should also be amended to provide procedural safe-
guards for Measure 37 claims.  The safeguards embodied in the
variance process should act as a model.  That is, a property owner
must show at least some level of hardship before a regulation is
waived.  There must also be a notice requirement to provide an
outlet for the concerns of neighboring property owners.
And finally, Measure 37 should provide more guidance regard-
ing the ramifications of waiving state law.  As it stands, local gov-
ernments will be breaking state law by granting waivers.
Exceptions allowing for waiver in the event of a Measure 37
claim must be built into each statute in ORS chapter 197.  These
exceptions, however, will ultimately swallow Oregon’s land-use
system.  1000 Friends of Oregon Executive Director Bob Stacey’s
161 Bob Stacey, Land-Use Limbo Fenced In or Fenced Out?, THE OREGONIAN,
Feb. 20, 2005, at F1.
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assertion may provide the best solution to this problem: “[T]he
measure should be changed to eliminate zoning waivers.  None
of us should have to fear that one of our neighbors will be al-
lowed to sidestep the laws intended to both limit and protect
us.”162
One piece of legislation considered early in the 2005 session,
S.B. 406, offered promising solutions to Measure 37’s problems.
Senator Kurt Schrader, a Democrat from Canby, Oregon, pro-
posed legislation that would provide prospective, but not retroac-
tive, relief to landowners.  The legislation also proposed a
funding source for compensation claims: “Everyone has two
choices here . . . . We can let courts go ahead and figure out how
this is going to be implemented.  Or we can have the state Legis-
lature step up and make sense out of a very ambiguous, albeit
well-intentioned, ballot measure.”163  If the 2007 Legislature (or
a future substitute initiative) can make these fundamental
changes to Measure 37, it might be saved from the fate of its
predecessor, Measure 7.
162 Id.
163 Laura Oppenheimer and Ashbel S. Gren, Challenges to Land Law Face Slim
Prospects , THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 12, 2004, at A1 (quoting Kurt Schrader).
